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CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS AND PRECEDENT:
A PRELIMINARY STUDY*
FRANK B. CROSS**
Chief Justice Roberts has professed a dedication to stare decisis,
but the authenticity of his commitment has been challenged. This
Article represents a preliminary attempt to assess the Chief
Justice's view of precedent, examining the opinions he issued in
his first Term. While citations are seldom studied quantitatively,
they offer a tool for insight into judicial decisionmaking.
The study of Chief Justice Roberts's opinions reveals some
distinct characteristics about his dedication to stare decisis. The
Chief Justice tended to cite to more precedents than did other
Justices, but he was also more likely to treat precedents
negatively, by distinguishing or overruling them. He often
reached out to address precedents not raised by the parties' briefs
and ignored precedents that the parties believed to be relevant.
This brief study illuminates a richer and more sophisticated
understanding of stare decisis. Precedent is not simply governing
or irrelevant. Prior decisions represent a web into which current
decisions are placed. The existing precedents may not dictate
particular outcomes or opinions in the current decisions, but they
influence those decisions. Likewise, the choices of which
precedents to cite in the current decisions serve to shape the
course of the law, and to influence future decisions. Chief Justice
Roberts has an apparent commitment to stare decisis, not in the
sense that he feels tightly bound by the directions of past cases,
but in the sense that he is influenced by those cases and uses them
to project his own influence on future decisions.
* Copyright © 2008 by Frank B. Cross.
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INTRODUCTION
John Roberts's tenure as Chief Justice is too new to allow any
firm conclusions about the behavior of the United States Supreme
Court under his leadership. Nevertheless, its beginning warrants
study. This Article examines the use of precedent in the Court, with a
focus on Chief Justice Roberts. In addition to shedding some light on
the nascent Court, I hope to illuminate new approaches to the study
of precedent and the use of the legal model in quantitative empirical
analyses.
I begin by reviewing the "conventional wisdom" regarding Chief
Justice Roberts's fealty to stare decisis. This general perception is
that he is a modest jurist who shows great respect for precedent, and
his confirmation testimony generally affirmed this view, though with
some qualifications.1 The first two Terms of the Roberts Court have
seen considerable controversy, with some commentators claiming that
the Chief Justice has manipulated precedent.2 Rather than taking any
claims at face value, this Article will examine what the Roberts Court
has done in actual practice. Before engaging in preliminary testing,
though, I review the existing quantitative empirical research on the
Court's use of precedent. While limited, these studies do offer
illuminating insights on the Justices' ability to pick and choose the
precedents they will follow or undermine.
Next, this Article reviews the use of precedent in the opinions
authored by the Chief Justice in his first Term. This includes a simple
count of the opinions cited as precedent by the Chief Justice, relative
to the number of opinions cited by other Justices in the Term. In
addition, I consider the treatment that the Chief Justice afforded
those citations and whether it was positive or negative, as compared
with the treatment of precedents by other Justices.
1. See infra notes 10-32 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Edward M. Kennedy, The Supreme Court's Wrong Turn-And How To
Correct It, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 2, 2007, at 14, 16 (complaining that Roberts and Alito
promised to respect precedent but voted so as to "essentially" reverse precedents).
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I also consider the extent to which citation to precedent is
discretionary, based upon a review of the briefs submitted to the
Court. In any given case, a number of precedents are obviously
relevant and cited by both the petitioners' and respondents' briefs.
Nevertheless, many of these cases go uncited in the opinions of Chief
Justice Roberts, which refer instead to many different precedents that
went unmentioned in the briefs of the parties. I investigate the
degree to which the Chief Justice relied on cases cited by both briefs
or by one brief, and the extent to which the opinion introduced
entirely distinct precedents that the briefs did not even mention.
This preliminary investigation provides some insight into Chief
Justice Roberts's use of precedent and is designed as an introduction
to future studies of the use of precedent by the Justices. This is a
fruitful field of research that has seen relatively little investigation.
Additional research could illuminate this aspect of the legal model of
Court decisionmaking and possibly the degree to which stare decisis
may be ideologically manipulated by the Court.
I. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS ON PRECEDENT
It has become common to think of Chief Justice Roberts as a
modest jurist who adheres strongly to precedent; however, firm
conclusions on his devotion to and use of precedent are difficult to
make.3 The Chief Justice has established a general reputation of
respect for judicial precedent.4 He has "professed humility and
respect for precedent."5 Professor Jeffrey Rosen was "impressed with
his reverence for the law."6 Richard Dieter of the Death Penalty
Information Center declared that Chief Justice Roberts had a " 'high
respect' " for precedents in the capital punishment context, opining
that he would not expand the reach of capital punishment.7 Rosen,
though, suggested that Roberts's devotion to precedent was uncertain
and "his vision of the force of precedent might evolve and grow
during decades on the Court."8 His prior service differed from his
3. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court:
Deference, Facial Challenges and the Comparative Competence of Courts, 59 SMU L. REV.
1735, 1758 (2006) (discussing the potential impact of Chief Justice Roberts's modest
judicial approach on the future of facial and as-applied constitutional challenges).
4. See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
5. Richard W. Garnett & Michael Stokes Paulsen, What Would Lincoln Do?, WKLY.
STANDARD, Oct. 16, 2006, at 16, 17.
6. Jeffrey Rosen, In Search of John Roberts, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2005, at A29.
7. Polly Ross Hughes, Death Penalty for Sex Offenders May Be Hard Sell, HOUS.
CHRON., Mar. 10, 2007, at B1.
8. Jeffrey Rosen, Bottoms Up, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 1, 2005, at 12, 13.
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role as a Supreme Court Justice, so he may not "have a well-thought-
out theory of stare decisis."9
The Senate hearings on the nomination of John Roberts focused
extensively on his views of precedent. The very first question asked
of him, by Senator Specter, involved the role of stare decisis.' ° In his
answer, Roberts agreed that the doctrine embodied an important goal
and observed that "the Founders appreciated the role of precedent in
promoting evenhandedness, predictability, stability, [and] the
appearance of integrity in the judicial process."" In response to a
questionnaire from the Senate Judiciary Committee, he declared that
precedent "plays an important role in promoting stability of the legal
system."' 2 Roberts subsequently urged recognizing "the importance
of settled expectations" in judicial decisions." In responding to
questions, Roberts elaborated:
I do think that it is a jolt to the legal system when you overrule
a precedent. Precedent plays an important role in promoting
stability and evenhandedness.... It is not enough that you may
think the prior decision was wrongly decided. That really
doesn't answer the question. It just poses the question. And
you do look at these other factors, like settled expectations, like
the legitimacy of the Court .... ."
He emphasized that the doctrine of stare decisis "serves as an
important check on judges."' 5
Roberts professed an intent to be "known as a modest judge,"
which involved "respect for precedent that forms part of the rule of
law that the judge is obligated to apply under principles of stare
decisis." 6 In deciding a case, he declared, "you begin obviously with
the precedents before you."17 Judges, in rendering decisions, "need to
be bound down by rules and precedents."18 Hence, he promised: "I
9. Rosen, supra note 6, at A29.
10. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., To Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
141 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Confirmation Hearings].
11. Id. at 142.
12. Id. at 179 (statement of Sen. Grassley, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary
(quoting John G. Roberts, Jr.)).
13. Id. at 142.
14. Id. at 144.
15. id. at 551.
16. Id. at 158.
17. Id. at 159.
18. Id. at 177-78.
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will follow the Supreme Court's precedents consistent with the
principles of stare decisis."19
While Roberts expressed the importance of stare decisis, he
indicated that he did not feel absolutely bound by past decisions. He
reported that "stare decisis is not an inexorable command 2 1 or an
"absolute rule,"' 2' and stated that the Supreme Court had explained
"the circumstances under which you should revisit a prior precedent
that you think may be flawed and when you shouldn't. 22 He noted
that some precedents may prove to be "unworkable 23 and observed
that the precedent may "have been eroded by subsequent
developments. '24  Roberts also distinguished among types of
precedents, suggesting that those involving property or statutory
interpretation might be given relatively greater strength.25  Among
the other bases he referenced for rejecting precedents was that "they
don't lead to predictable results, they're difficult to apply. ' 26 He cited
the overruling of Plessy and "Lochner-era decisions" as proper
rejections of stare decisis. 27  The testimony indicated that Roberts
recognized that the theory was not totally controlling of the Court's
decisions.
The comments by Chief Justice Roberts in his confirmation
hearings might be viewed as nothing more than pablum, and he broke
no new theoretical ground on the bases for reliance on precedent.28
Perhaps he was merely engaged in a "confirmation dance," declaring
whatever was necessary to receive the Senate's approval.29  His
comments might be taken with a grain of salt as a necessary and
insincere homage to stare decisis.30 Nevertheless, there was a general
19. Id. at 293.
20. Id. at 180.
21. Id. at 270.
22. Id. at 270.
23. Id. at 142, 144,
24. Id. at 142.
25. Id. at 181.
26. Id. at 180.
27. Id. at 144.
28. There are different "theories of precedent" that "vary among judges and over
time." ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 143 (2006). Roberts's
testimony consisted mostly of affirming broad and uncontroversial principles and did not
clearly identify his theory of precedent.
29. See Roberts Rope-a-Dopes Liberals, HUMAN EVENTS, Sept. 19, 2005, at 1
(suggesting, from a conservative viewpoint, that the hearing testimony was potentially
manipulative).
30. Linda Greenhouse, Precedents Begin Falling for Roberts Court, N.Y. TIMES, June
21, 2007, at A21.
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sense that he was by nature especially respectful of precedent.3' The
most frequent reason he gave for rejecting a precedent was that it had
proved unworkable, which is a fairly limiting rationale. Others who
testified at the hearings spoke of his " 'deepest respect for legal
principles and legal precedent.' "32
The initial Terms of the Roberts Court, though, created
considerable controversy about its fealty to precedent. It seemed to
some as if the Chief Justice were forcing his preferred results into the
body of precedent in an artificial, Procrustean manner. Ralph Neas
of People for the American Way declared that the Court had
" 'shown the same respect for precedent that a wrecking ball shows
for a plate-glass window.' "" The ACLU's legal director declared:
" 'Having begun with a promise to respect precedent and seek
consensus, the Roberts court has so far done neither.' "I' Edward
Lazarus declared that the "Roberts court also showed little regard for
the court's own precedents, overruling or eviscerating a slew of past
decisions that did not conform to conservative principles."35
Professor Ronald Dworkin described Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito as leading a "revolution Jacobin in its disdain for
tradition and precedent"36 that demonstrated that Chief Justice
Roberts's "Senate testimony was actually a coded script for the
continuing subversion of the American constitution."37
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. ],38 the prominent recent decision on race-based school
assignments, a liberal minority charged that the majority opinion of
31. See Diane S. Sykes, "Of a Judiciary Nature": Observations on Chief Justice's First
Opinions, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1027, 1031 (2007) (suggesting that what emerged from the
hearing testimony was that Chief Justice Roberts would be "attentive to the discretion-
limiting force of decisional rules and precedent").
32. Roberts Confirmation Hearings, supra note 10, at 476 (statement of Maureen E.
Mahoney, Partner, Latham & Watkins, L.L.P., Washington, D.C. (quoting Letter from the
Office of the Solicitor Gen. to S. Comm. on the Judiciary)).
33. Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2007, at Al (quoting Ralph G. Neas).
34. David G. Savage, High Court Has Entered a New Era; The Chief Justice, with Help
from Fellow Bush Appointee Alito, Carries Big Ruling to the Right-A Generational Shift,
L.A. TIMES, July 1, 2007, at Al (quoting Steven R. Shapiro).
35. Edward Lazarus, Editorial, Under John Roberts, Court Re-Rights Itself, WASH.
POST, July 1, 2007, at B1.
36. Ronald Dworkin, The Supreme Court Phalanx, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 27, 2007,
at 92, 92.
37. Id. at 101.
38. 551 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
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Chief Justice Roberts "distorts precedent. '39  Perhaps the more
remarkable critique came from Justice Scalia, who indicted the Chief
Justice's majority opinion in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life,'
limiting the scope of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act,41 as the
"judicial obfuscation" of "faux judicial restraint."'42 Chief Justice
Roberts maintained, though, that his conservative decisions were in
fact grounded in precedent, and he avoided the overrulings favored
by Justice Scalia.43
Professors Mary Ann Glendon and Douglas Kmiec applauded
the Court:
Despite some ideological carping from those who lost cases that
depended upon the extension of past decisions, Roberts and
Alito have also shown themselves to be strongly respectful of
precedent. Advocates this term urged overturning previous
abortion decisions, a Warren Court ruling allowing taxpayers to
sue in religion cases, and campaign spending limits. The new
justices left those precedents in place, often resisting both their
unwarranted extension to new facts and the urging of Justices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas to overrule them.'
This may be excessive praise, as the Court majority certainly
limited the scope of equal protection and privacy precedents.45 It is
significant, though, that Chief Justice Roberts at most bent, and did
not break, precedents. He did not vote to overrule Grutter v.
Bollinger,46 though his opinion clearly hints that this would have been
his ideological desire.47 There is some indication that Chief Justice
Roberts is devoted to "incremental change" in precedent, rather than
39. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. .... , 127 S.
Ct. 2738, 2800 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). For an editorialist, Chief Justice Roberts
"pretended to follow the earlier ruling while ripping its guts out." E.J. Dionne, Jr., Op-
Ed., Not One More Roberts or Alito, WASH. POST, June 29, 2007, at A21.
40. 551 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
41. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(2002).
42. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. -,- n.7, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2684 n.7 (2007)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
43. Id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2664-65.
44. Mary Ann Glendon & Douglas W. Kmiec, The Best Kind of Justices, 30 LEGAL
TIMES, July 2, 2007, at 54.
45. See Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S .... 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1630-38
(2007); supra note 39. In both cases, Chief Justice Roberts stopped short of Scalia's
desires to reverse precedents but reached the same result. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S.
at , 127 S. Ct. at 2767-68; Carhart II, 550 U.S. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 1639.
46. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
47. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at _, 127 S. Ct. at 2768 ("The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.").
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dramatic reversals.48 Professor Jack Balkin described the difference
between Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts as "the difference
between bomb throwing and dismantling."49  This, of course, is a
difference, and a potentially material one. Any conclusions about the
Roberts Court and precedent, though, could be improved by
consideration of more rigorous study.
II. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF PRECEDENT
Historically, quantitative empirical study of the judiciary did not
attend much to the role of precedent in judicial decisionmaking. The
early research of this type was conducted by political scientists and
primarily analyzed the extent to which judicial decisions appeared
ideological in outcome." This yielded the "attitudinal model"
associated with Professors Segal and Spaeth, which suggested that the
Justices' decisions were governed, not by the law, but by their
personal ideological preferences, much as legal realism had long
professed." Considerable empirical evidence was amassed by
political scientists to demonstrate the association between ideology
and Justice-votes. It is said to be the "common sense of the
discipline that Supreme Court justices ... should be viewed as
promoters of their personal policy preferences rather than as
interpreters of law."53
The attitudinal model fell well short of explaining all the Court's
decisions, though, and it suffered criticism for ignoring legal variables
that could explain those decisions.54 The Justices' heavy reliance on
precedent in their opinions facially indicated that they were basing
their judgments on this legal measure and not simply on their
ideological preferences. For the attitudinalists, though, these
references were merely a means of cloaking the true basis for the
48. Robert Barnes, Roberts Court Moves Right, But With a Measured Step, WASH.
POST, Apr. 20, 2007, at A3.
49. Linda Greenhouse, Even in Agreement, Scalia Puts Roberts to Lash, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 2007, at Al.
50. For a review of this research, see Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New
Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251,
275-79 (1997).
51. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 64-72 (1993); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTlTUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86-97 (2002).
52. Some of this research is summarized in Cross, supra note 50, at 275-80.
53. Howard Gillman, What's Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the
"Legal Model" of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 466 (2001).
54. See Cross, supra note 50, at 285-311 (critiquing the limited empirical approach of
behavioralists and their reliance on the attitudinal model of judicial decisionmaking).
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Justices' decisions in legal parlance, in order to maintain the
legitimacy of the Court as a legal body." Some maintained that the
corpus of available precedents was so extensive as to support any
predetermined conclusion of the Justices. 6 This dispute over the role
of precedent required closer examination. One strain of research
examined the Court's choices in overruling precedents, but such
overruling is a very rare event. 7
The foundational quantitative study of precedent was conducted
in the 1970s by Professors Landes and Posner." They examined
citation rates in different areas of the law, and the average age of
precedents utilized by the Supreme Court and federal circuit courts.59
Landes and Posner conceived of precedents as "legal capital" that
depreciated and was periodically produced in response to needs.60
They also considered the possibility that judges would disregard
precedents in pursuit of their preferred policy ends.61  They
hypothesized that Warren Court-era "judicial activism" would appear
in the expedited depreciation of older precedents, but found little
evidence of such an effect.62 The research considered only absolute
numbers of citations, though, and not treatment of particular
decisions.
A 1986 study considered the Court's citation patterns.63 It
examined the pattern of citations for a random sample of twenty-
seven decisions issued between 1947 and 1974.6 The author found
55. See HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY
WILL 287-315 (1999) (presenting empirical evidence that the Justices most commonly vote
their preferences rather than the governing precedents).
56. Thus, the claim that "the Supreme Court has generated so much precedent that it
is usually possible to find support for any conclusion." LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G.
WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA: RIGHTS, LIBERTIES,
AND JUSTICE 21 (1995). Even traditional legal scholars have recognized this principle,
acknowledging that stare decisis presents "choice of precedents." HENRY J. ABRAHAM,
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 325 (6th ed. 1993). Judge Easterbrook bluntly declared that
"precedent doesn't govern." Linda Greenhouse, Precedent for Lower Courts, Tyrant or
Teacher?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1988, at B7.
57. See SAUL BRENNER & HAROLD J. SPAETH, STARE INDECISIS: THE
ALTERATION OF PRECEDENT ON THE SUPREME COURT, 1946-1992, at 22-23 (1995)
(noting that the Court quite infrequently overrules precedent).
58. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 250-52 (1976).
59. Id. at 251-61.
60. Id. at 262.
61. See id. at 274-75.
62. Id. at 290-92.
63. Charles A. Johnson, Follow-Up Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 W. POL.
Q. 538, 538 (1986).
64. Id. at 540.
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that most citations were not substantive, but instead were often
contained in string citations.65 Ideology did not appear to have a
significant effect on choice of citations, while the legal model
appeared to have more influence.' A book-length examination of
reproductive rights and death penalty cases concluded that the
Justices' ideology did not rule their interpretation of precedents.67
Segal and Spaeth themselves proceeded to conduct the largest
study on the interaction of ideology and precedent in the Court."
They took certain major or "landmark" decisions issued by the Court
that were accompanied by dissent and then identified progeny cases
governed by the landmark precedent.69 They examined the voting
behavior of the dissenting Justices in the subsequent progeny cases.70
The hypothesis was that if precedent governed them, they would
change the direction of their votes, while if they were ruled by their
ideological preferences, their votes would not change.71 The results
differed by Justice but were generally consistent over time and
throughout the Court-the vast majority of Justices did not let the
intervening precedent alter their votes.72 In the progeny cases,
dissenting Justices continued to vote their preferences ninety percent
of the time, notwithstanding the precedent from which they
dissented.73 This study called into serious question the significance of
precedent as a determinant of Supreme Court decisions.
This analysis did not close the issue. Some questioned whether
the methodology effectively tested for adherence to precedent. The
Supreme Court controls its docket and takes very few of the cases
offered it on appeal. The Court is unlikely to grant certiorari on a
case that is uncontroversial and falls squarely under its preexisting
precedent.74 Many of the cases the Court selects are chosen
"precisely because they raise issues about the interpretation of
65. Id. at 542-43, 546.
66. Id. at 546.
67. LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL
CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 302 (1992).
68. SPAETH & SEGAL, supra note 55, at 287-88.
69. Id. at 24.
70. Id. at 33-34.
71. Id. at 35-40.
72. Id. at 309.
73. Id. The authors also studied less significant cases and found that the dissenting
Justices followed their preferences in 82.4% of these as well. Id.
74. See SuP. Cr. R. 10 (setting out standards for making certiorari decisions and
noting the significance of the legal importance of case).
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landmark precedent that have no clear answers."75 Thus, a continued
dissent need not represent any sort of repudiation of the precedent,
but may simply demonstrate a reluctance to expand its scope beyond
that set out in the initial holding.76 Insofar as the principle of stare
decisis does not normally "mean that dissenting justices gravitate
toward the position held by the majority of their colleagues," the
research did not test all its potential effects."
Segal and Spaeth did not analyze summary dispositions of the
Court, which are those where the law is considered so clear that an
explanatory opinion is deemed unnecessary. But, these may actually
provide the best evidence of the effect of precedent, because they
could involve cases where a precedent was plainly controlling.78
Professors Songer and Lindquist later examined these summary
dispositions, and they revealed that the Justices "cast more than
three-fourths of their votes in favor of precedent" rather than
ideological preference.79 Segal and Spaeth have argued in response
that these are not tantamount to merits decisions and may not yield
dissents, even when Justices disagreed with the outcome."
The particular coding conventions of the study might also be
challenged. For example, when a Justice dissented from a precedent
and then joined a majority in a later decision that limited the
potential scope of that precedent, Segal and Spaeth considered that to
be an attitudinal vote.81 While this is plausibly ideological, the
outcome in no way shows disrespect for the precedent. The progeny
opinion may have expressly accepted the validity of the prior
precedent while confining its scope. The refusal to expand the
importance of a precedent is in no way a rejection of the governing
significance of precedent. A reexamination of the cases found that in
most of the progeny, "the Court's opinion ... explicitly reaffirms the
75. Donald R. Songer & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Not the Whole Story: The Impact of
Justices' Values on Supreme Court Decision Making, 40 AM. J. POL. SI. 1049, 1050 (1996).
76. See Saul Brenner & Marc Stier, Retesting Segal and Spaeth's Stare Decisis Model,
96 AM. J. POL. SC. 1036, 1039 (1996) (noting how the pattern of ideological voting could
be explained because the progeny cases were "dissimilar").
77. Gillman, supra note 53, at 483.
78. Brenner & Stier, supra note 76, at 1042 (noting that summary disposition cases
must be studied to provide a "complete picture" of the role of precedent at the court); see
also Songer & Lindquist, supra note 75, at 1057 (noting that these are the cases providing
error correction for lower court failure to adhere to clear precedent).
79. Songer & Lindquist, supra note 75, at 1061.
80. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Norms, Dragons, and Stare Decisis: A
Response, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1064, 1079 (1996).
81. Songer & Lindquist, supra note 75, at 1051-54.
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doctrine announced in the landmark case. '8 2 Some discretion was
required in coding, and Professor Barry Friedman has analyzed the
coding of one particular decision as incorrect.83
A recoding of the cases showed the sensitivity to the ultimate
findings. In this analysis, Professors Songer and Lindquist examined
whether the dissenter's opinion in the progeny appeared to show
adherence to the landmark precedent, such as the joining of a
majority opinion that reaffirmed the precedent's validity. 4  They
found that this reduced the proportion of votes attributable to Justice
ideology from ninety percent to seventy percent.85 Segal and Spaeth
have responded in detail to this coding dispute, and the resolution
involves a detailed, case-by-case analysis.86
Moreover, attempts to replicate the results using somewhat
different approaches have generally not confirmed the findings of the
study. One study compared "institutional" stare decisis (following
the majority opinion in a case) with "individual" stare decisis
(following the individual justice's vote in that case), much like the
Segal and Spaeth design.87  The study showed significant variation
among the Justices, but concluded that institutional stare decisis was
overall a powerful determinant.88 A recent, yet-unpublished study
altered the Segal and Spaeth approach to measure new Justices'
decisions in progeny cases when their ideological beliefs would
appear to call for a deviation from the precedent set in the initial
landmark opinion.89 It found that the landmark precedent had a
powerful effect on the Justices' decisions.90
Without entering the coding and replication thicket, the main
shortcoming of the study's approach was the failure to recognize the
endogeneity of the progeny cases. The research did not consider the
"possible effects of precedent on the Court's agenda and litigation
environment."91  Cases do not reach the Supreme Court docket
randomly, and the landmark precedent itself may shape which
82. Id. at 1054.
83. Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, PERSP. POL., June 2006, at 266-67.
84. Songer & Lindquist, supra note 75, at 1055.
85. Id. at 1055.
86. Segal & Spaeth, supra note 80, at 1067-73.
87. Youngsik Lim, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Justices' Decision
Making, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 723 (2000).
88. Id. at 747-48.
89. Linda M. Merola, The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of United Supreme
Court Justices: A Second Look 13-14 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
90. Id. at 18.
91. Gillman, supra note 53, at 481.
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progeny cases reach the Court. The Court will not take new cases
that are plainly governed by the landmark precedent. 92
Consequently, looking at decisions in progeny cases simply does not
test whether a governing precedent would control the Justices' votes.
The examination simply shows that Justice ideology matters when it
comes to deciding whether a precedent should be expanded or
distinguished.
Indeed, the nature of certiorari largely dooms any effort to study
the binding power of precedent. Suppose that, out of one thousand
cases presented to the Court for review, nine hundred were clearly
governed by prior Court precedent and that precedent-respectful
Justices would follow the precedent, contrary to their preferences.
Suppose also that such Justices have no incentive to take certiorari on
these nine hundred cases, both because they are relatively
uncontroversial as a legal matter and because the Justices might be
compelled to vote against their preferences. As a result, the Justices
take the one hundred cases that are not clearly governed by existing
precedent. Given the lack of clear direction in these cases, the
Justices vote ideologically in all of them. Given these suppositions,
we have a case in which a study of opinions would show the Justices
to be 100% ideological in the decided opinions, when in fact they
were only 10% ideological for the full body of cases comprising the
cert pool, and were 0% ideological for cases plainly governed by
precedent. Given docket control, examinations of the results of
decided cases cannot capture the significance of precedent, as they
consider but the tip of the iceberg and may, therefore, mislead.
Professors Richards and Kritzer sought to address this effect, to
some degree, in their study of "jurisprudential regimes."93  They
suggest that the Court does not create precedents "that define or
predict outcomes of future Supreme Court cases," but instead
establish rules that structure the analysis of those future cases.94 They
studied the jurisprudential regime of content-neutrality in freedom of
expression cases, established by the Court in 1972. They found a
statistically significant effect of the legal variables associated with the
regime in Court decisions rendered after that date.95 Before the
regime's creation, content-neutrality was not such a significant
determinant, but after its creation, the variable became a significant
92. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
93. Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme
Court Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 305 (2002).
94. Id. at 306.
95. Id. at 314.
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determinant of the Justices' decisions.96 This methodology accounted,
in part, for the case selection process and demonstrated that a
precedent-at least a powerful regime-creating precedent-has a
significant effect on future votes.97 It still underestimated the
potential effect of Supreme Court precedent, however, by examining
only the cases that the Court chose to analyze, which presumably
excludes those most plainly governed by a precedent. An
unpublished study of First Amendment decisions between 1974 and
1996 found mixed effects.98 The authors considered the Court's
choice to cite precedents, considering the ideological position of the
potential citers and the mean ideological position of the coalition that
produced the precedential opinion. They found that a Court was
more likely to cite a precedent on the governing law while the
ideology of the precedent had but a trivial effect on citation
probability,99 though the effect was somewhat greater for significant
treatment of a precedent, such as "following" it."' The authors
concluded that "the Supreme Court makes an effort to follow legally
relevant precedents, quite apart from ideological considerations.' 10 1
A new, yet-unpublished study examines the precedents
mentioned in the syllabus of the Supreme Court opinion (as a proxy
for the important cases) and how they were treated in that opinion. 1°2
The authors integrated the ideological direction of the precedent with
the ideological preferences of the contemporaneous Supreme Court,
President, and both Houses of Congress as independent variables that
might determine the outcome of a set of civil rights, civil liberties, and
economic cases. 1°' While the Justices' ideologies were significant,
precedent was a much more powerful determinant of the case
outcome than even ideology."°  However, because the majority
opinion author controls the cases cited in the syllabus, this apparent
96. Id.
97. Id. at 315-16.
98. Kevin T. McGuire & Michael MacKuen, Precedent and Preferences on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 11, 26-28 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
99. Id. at 19.
100. Id. at 22-23.
101. Id. at 25.
102. Richard L. Pacelle, Jr. et al., Of Opportunities and Constraints: Decision Making
in the Modern Supreme Court (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
103. Id. at 33 tbl.3 (Integrated Model of Supreme Court Decision Making: Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties v. Economic Cases).
104. Id.
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reliance on precedent could reflect strategic ideological citing of past
opinions in the syllabus.
Another very elaborate study of the Supreme Court's use of
precedent was recently published by Hansford and Spriggs. 1°5 Rather
than focusing on the effect of precedent on Court outcomes, this
study examined the Justices' decisions to use a particular precedent or
not, though it was limited to the most prominent citations, such as
"followed" or "distinguished."" They hypothesized that precedents
have different levels of "legal vitality," which is a proxy for their
influence.107 When the Court positively interprets a precedent, "it
takes on greater authority," while a negative interpretation means
that the "precedent's legal authority is diminished."" The book
tested multiple propositions about precedent citation, but essentially
the authors argued that the nature of a citation to a precedent was
based on its existing vitality and its ideological distance from the
current Court.1°9 Hansford and Spriggs found that both precedent
vitality and ideological distance were significant determinants of the
interpretation of precedents.110 Interestingly, a key determinant of a
negative interpretation of precedent was a combination of vitality and
ideological distance, suggesting that the Court might go out of its way
to cite, in order to negatively treat, a vital opinion that it ideologically
disfavors."' The authors proceeded to demonstrate the practical
significance of the Supreme Court's citation of a precedent by
showing that the negative treatment had a substantial effect on
subsequent citations to the negatively treated case."1
This seminal research is very informative about the Court's
strategic invocation of precedent in molding the law, but it may
presume an exaggerated ability of the Justices to choose their
citations. The use of a precedent in a Court decision may be
unavoidable because of its obvious relevance to the case. It is
relatively common for the parties for both sides of a case to cite many
of the same precedents in their briefs."1 3 This signals that the parties
consider this precedent to be of unavoidable relevance for the Court,
105. THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT
ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (2006).
106. Id. at 58.
107. Id. at 23.
108. Id. at 25.
109. Id. at 32-37.
110. Id. at 64.
111. Id. at 64, 71.
112. Id. at 109-23.
113. See infra tbl.3.
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possibly requiring a citation. In such circumstances, the choice is not
whether to cite a case but how to cite it. Hansford and Spriggs sought
to control for this effect, but their controls were very rough.1 4
This background shows how research on the Supreme Court's
use of precedent is now growing, but the recent studies have only
scratched the surface of the topic." 5 The Hansford and Spriggs study
is enormously significant but fails to consider fully the application of
precedent and the legal variables that may constrain choice. Much
additional research can better reveal the use of stare decisis at the
Court, and the following discussion begins this analysis with a review
of the first Term of the Roberts Court.
III. CITATION TO PRECEDENT IN THE ROBERTS COURT
The relative use of precedent can be readily examined by looking
at the content of Supreme Court opinions: one can simply count the
precedents cited by an opinion. This, of course, is a very rough test
for fealty to precedent; citing more precedents might be a sign of
infidelity to a few governing precedents. One can go beyond counting
and examine the nature of an opinion's use of precedents. For
example, the express overruling of a precedent requires a citation to
the precedential decision. Yet such a citation is hardly evidence of
respect for the power of precedent. Precedent is said to be "a fairly
plastic substance that can be used in a variety of ways to support and
challenge a variety of positions."'116
This Article provides a small preliminary step toward the
analysis of Justices' use of precedent. I first examined the use of
precedent in opinions authored by Chief Justice Roberts during his
first year on the job. Citation frequency was my first consideration.
One might anticipate that a Justice who placed particular importance
on stare decisis would cite a larger number of precedents to support
114. HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 105, at 62. They had a control for "court
agenda" but it involved only a broad definition of the case's issue area (e.g., economic
regulation) and no more precise control for relevance of particular precedents.
115. The above literature review focuses on the intersection of ideology and stare
decisis and does not cover all the empirical studies of citation practices. One excellent
study of state courts examined the development of wrongful discharge rules and found
that citations were used to legitimate doctrinal advances. David J. Walsh, On the Meaning
and Pattern of Legal Citations: Evidence from State Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases,
31 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 337, 350-57 (1997). Others have examined the communication of
precedents among the courts of the states. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira, The
Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of State Supreme Courts, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
178, 188-92 (1985); Peter Harris, Ecology and Culture in the Communication of Precedent
Among State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 19 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 449, 465-75 (1985).
116. T.R. VAN GEEL, UNDERSTANDING SUPREME COURT OPINIONS 115 (1991).
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his or her judgment. I measured the number of separate case
citations in the majority or plurality opinions authored by each of the
Justices in the initial Term of the Roberts Court. 1 7 The results are
displayed in the following figure.

















Considerable caution must be used in drawing conclusions from
these results. The sample size per Justice was quite small, averaging
only around eight opinions. These opinions are assigned
intentionally, not randomly. Chief Justice Roberts controlled the
assignment of many of these cases, and of all those cases in which he
drafted the opinion of the Court.18 It appears that different types of
117. Whether this is the best coding convention is debatable. By my approach, I
counted a citation to a case only once, even if the same case was cited again later in the
opinion. Arguably, each subsequent citation should also be counted. Nor did I distinguish
whether the cited case was issued by the Supreme Court or a different court or whether it
was to a majority or separate opinion. The Justices have different conventions for citing
the history of the case at hand, and I counted citations to its history only once (though
some opinions cited all the prior decisions and the grant of certiorari).
118. The significance of self-assignment is unclear. While some Chief Justices, such as
Warren, have tended to keep especially important cases for themselves, Chief Justice
Rehnquist did not display this tendency to self-assign important opinions. See Forest
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cases tended to yield more citations; in particular, constitutional
criminal decisions appear to have relied more heavily on a greater
number of precedents than did other case types. Some cases simply
have more relevant precedents and would be expected to yield more
citations." 9 Opinions with dissents tend to have more citations,
perhaps because of the nature of the case or perhaps because of the
presence of the challenge raised by the dissent.12' Finally, the
implication of citing more cases is unclear-it may be that Justices
cite cases more frequently to shore up otherwise questionable
conclusions.12 1 Some research indicates that Supreme Court opinions
that contain more citations produce closer adherence by lower courts,
so this citation choice may reflect an intent to give the opinion greater
doctrinal power.1 22 Recent network research indicates that Supreme
Court opinions that contain more citations also receive more
subsequent citations, further suggesting the importance of this
measure.
23
Notwithstanding all these caveats, the results are somewhat
revealing. Chief Justice Roberts cited more precedents in his average
opinion (twenty-seven) than did any other Justice during this Term.
His average opinion cited over twice as many cases as did an average
opinion written by Justice Kennedy (twelve). His average citation
rate was roughly twenty percent greater than that of the next highest
Justice (twenty-two). The first Term citation rate thus provides some
Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, May It Please the Chief? Opinion Assignments in the
Rehnquist Court, 40 AM. J. POL. Sci. 421,435 (1996).
119. See infra tbl.3.
120. Social scientists have theorized that a reason for reliance on precedential citations
is the legitimation of judicial authority. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES
JUSTICES MAKE 45 (1998) (suggesting that the Justices must "make accommodations over
the interpretation of precedent because they believe that doing so enhances the
probability that society will consider the resulting decision legitimate"). Justice Stevens
has observed that following precedent "obviously enhances the institutional strength of
the judiciary." John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1983).
121. See Walsh, supra note 115, at 340 ("[C]ourts faced with uncertainty surrounding
the adoption of new legal doctrines and motivated by the desire to win acceptance for
their decisions can be expected to employ citations most intensively when, in fact,
acceptance is most problematic."); see also Lawrence A. Friedman, et al., State Supreme
Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 815 (1981) (claiming that a
"change in the law... calls for a broad search for authority").
122. See Charles A. Johnson, Law, Politics, and Judicial Decision Making: Lower
Federal Court Uses of Supreme Court Decisions, 21 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 325, 332 tbl.2
(1987) (finding a positive association for all measures of compliance and statistical
significance for lower court reasoning).
123. See James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal
Importance of Supreme Court Precedents, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324, 335 (2007).
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indication of the importance that Chief Justice Roberts places on the
role of precedent.
Simple citation frequency provides a very limited test of a
Justice's commitment to precedent, though. At the extreme, it is
clearly relevant-a Justice who cited zero precedents cannot be said
to be using the rule of stare decisis. However, it is not clear that
citing twenty-five precedents, as opposed to fifteen, demonstrates
greater respect for stare decisis. The larger number of citations may
simply reflect the nature of the case at hand or reveal a tendency to
fill opinions with string citations that carry little weight. 124
More significantly, the simple counting of precedents does not
consider the manner in which the opinion treated them. An opinion
might cite many cases yet call for them to be overturned, which would
not demonstrate fealty to the rule of precedent. Short of overturning,
precedents may be treated in differing ways. A court may limit the
power of a precedent by interpreting it narrowly, such as
distinguishing its application to the case before the Court. For
example, after the Court in Wisconsin v. Constantineau125 had held
generally that the government had to provide a party a due process
hearing before taking a certain stigmatizing action,2 6 the Court in
Paul v. Davis2 7 cited Constantineau but narrowed its scope by finding
that stigmatization alone did not demand a hearing, noting that the
earlier case also involved a tangible detriment (loss of right to
purchase alcohol). 28  This substantially narrowed the apparent
requirements of the Constantineau precedent.
Alternatively, a decision may take a precedent and expand its
scope, perhaps ignoring limitations implicit or explicit in the earlier
case. This application may be illustrated by the opinion in Bowen v.
Kendrick,129 which held that the government could constitutionally
make grants to religious institutions for sexual counseling. 3 ° The
Court relied on Tilton v. Richardson,' which had authorized
124. See Walsh, supra note 115, at 337 ("Even researchers who study citations express
reservations about their meaningfulness, particularly in light of the large proportion of
citations that are of the nonsubstantive 'string' variety.").
125. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
126. Id. at 437.
127. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
128. Id. at 707. In dissent, Justice Brennan maintained that the decision marked a
"clear retreat" from the Court's prior decisions on the right to a hearing. Id. at 724
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
130. Id. at 622.
131. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
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government construction grants to religious colleges. In a dissent,
Justice Blackmun contended that this reliance had "skew[ed] the
Establishment Clause analysis" by ignoring the sectarian purposes of
the use of the funds and suggested that Tilton was inapposite because
it involved largely secular instruction.'32 He also noted that Tilton
relied on the "skepticism of the college student," while Bowen
extended the case to services for adolescents, which he found "simply
not comparable." '133 The Court in Bowen thus considerably expanded
the legal scope of its earlier decision.
Hansford and Spriggs considered these differences in their
distinction of negative and positive treatment of precedents.' While
Chief Justice Roberts cited many precedents, it is important to
consider the treatment he afforded them. I examined his use of
precedent through what might be called "reverse Shepardizing" his
citations. This involved taking his citations and examining how the
Shepard's service evaluated his treatment of those precedents.'35 This
data was compiled for three Justices during Chief Justice Roberts's
first Term, and the relative rates of their respective treatments of
precedents are displayed in Table 1. These are percentages of their
total citations, and because Chief Justice Roberts had many more
citations, he had the highest absolute number for each of the
treatments of precedent.
Table 1. Treatment by Opinion Author.
Roberts Kennedy Stevens
Followed 11.3% 12.1% 9.6%
Explained 12.0% 0.01% 13.2%
Distinguished 22.7% 7.7% 4.8%
Overruled in Part 8.7% 0.01% 10.8%
The results reveal some interesting differences in the treatment
of precedent. While all the Justices were comparable in probability of
following precedent, Justice Kennedy was much less likely to explain
132. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 631 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 637-38.
134. See HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 105, at 43-54.
135. The Shepard's service coding system has been used in empirical analysis and
found to be sufficiently reliable and valid for such studies. See id., supra note 105, at 44-
54.
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or overrule a precedent in part. The "overruled in part" cases were
primarily state or circuit court decisions, which is not such an
aggressive action as if they were prior Supreme Court decisions.
Chief Justice Roberts also was much more likely to distinguish a past
precedent in his opinions. The higher citation rate of Chief Justice
Roberts was accompanied by a disproportionately higher negative
treatment rate for precedents. The results for this one Term suggest
that Chief Justice Roberts is aggressive in giving negative treatment
to prior cases.
For context, the same analysis was performed for the majority
opinions of the final Term of the Rehnquist Court, for the Chief
Justice and the same two Associate Justices, with results reported in
Table 2.
Table 2. Treatment by Opinion Author.
Rehnquist Kennedy Stevens
Followed 15.8% 0% 9.7%
Explained 6.7% 3.5% 4.4%
Distinguished 4.5% 3.5% 4.4%
Overruled in Part 0.5% 4.9% 1.8%
This amplifies the finding that Chief Justice Roberts was
relatively aggressive in his negative treatment of precedents, as his
rates for distinguishing and overruling precedents were distinctly
higher than those of the other Justices studied.
The implications of Roberts's negative treatment of precedent
are not entirely clear. One might view such negative citations as
disrespectful of stare decisis by undermining the corpus of existing
cases. But a negative treatment might well be perfectly respectful of
precedent. It cites the apparently contrary case, rather than ignoring
it. Moreover, a negative treatment may be a perfectly appropriate
application of a cited case. When a precedent is distinguished, for
example, that may be entirely correct and consistent with the
underlying cited decision; that is the rationale behind distinguishing
prior opinions. The choice to follow such a precedent in a later
opinion may be an expansion beyond its intended bounds, and the
original author may have intended a result much like that of the
subsequent distinguishing decision. Thus, the decision in Bowen was
arguably an overextension of the Tilton precedent and not truly
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grounded in stare decisis, notwithstanding its apparent reliance on
precedent. 13 6  Consequently, the meaning of the higher negative
treatment of precedents by Chief Justice Roberts is uncertain. His
opinions clearly show respect for stare decisis in their frequency of
citations, but his relatively high negative treatment rate suggests that
he is not tightly bound by precedent.
The Hansford and Spriggs study suggests that Justices choose
which precedents to treat favorably or unfavorably. Chief Justice
Roberts's opinion in Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart3 7 found that police
officers were justified in entering a home without a warrant under
exigent circumstances, regardless of the officer's state of mind, and
that the entry at issue was reasonable. 3 ' Four of its citations were
coded as "followed," for the proposition that the officer's state of
mind was irrelevant.'39 Of these cases, three were authored by
Rehnquist, and one was written by Scalia. Two of the cases followed
actually produced liberal results, but Chief Justice Roberts followed
them on the more conservative proposition regarding the officer's
state of mind. 4° This shows, to a degree, the importance of opinion
content, rather than outcome. 41 In addition to the choice of
precedent treatment, Justices may exercise choice in the precedents
they mention in the opinion, which is examined in the following Part.
IV. CHOICES OF PRECEDENT IN THE ROBERTS COURT
The study of precedent must confront the different circumstances
in which cases are cited. This analysis can take advantage of a
heretofore underutilized tool of empirical research: the briefs
presented to the Court by the parties. 42  Because precedent is a
136. See, e.g., Tracy Sullivan Prewitt, Bowen v. Kendrick: The Constitutionality of the
Adolescent Family Life Act-Has the Court Given Us a Lemon?, 28 J. FAM. L. 87, 103-13
(1990) (suggesting that the Supreme Court's analysis in Bowen marked a significant
departure from prior cases and that its reliance on Tilton was misplaced).
137. 547 U.S. 398 (2006).
138. Id. at 406-07.
139. The cases are Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806 (1996); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); and Scott v. United States,
436 U.S. 128 (1978).
140. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 404 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, and Graham, 490 U.S. at
397).
141. In one of the liberal outcomes, Graham, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and
Marshall filed a separate concurring opinion, suggesting that the content of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion was not so liberal. Graham, 490 U.S. at 399-400 (Blackmun,
Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
142. One study did examine the reliance on precedent in briefs of the parties. It
examined the number of citations to precedent in the briefs' tables of authorities as a
percentage of all sources cited in thirteen cases. Relative use of precedent varied from
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persuasive tool, the briefs cite numerous precedents. 43 Often, both
sides cite a case as governing precedent, though sometimes a case will
be cited by only the petitioner or only the respondent.
Hansford and Spriggs contended that "there is often decisional
leeway in determining whether a precedent governs a case," and they
structured their research around this choice.1" Justices, however, do
not have a completely free hand in citing precedents. Some are surely
unavoidable-a case disputing the proper application of the Miranda
rights surely has to cite to Miranda v. Arizona.45  One may
distinguish discretionary Supreme Court behavior by examining the
opinion's relative citation of cases presented by both parties, by one
party (and if that party prevailed at the Court), or by neither party.
One might think that if both parties relied on the case, it would be an
unavoidable citation for the Court's opinion. The Supreme Court
opinion may also introduce new citations, the relevance of which was
unforeseen in the briefs. Alternatively, it may entirely ignore
precedents that one or both of the parties considered relevant to the
action. This is where one finds the discretionary citation patterns.
To assess the choice of citations, I examined the cases cited in the
petitioners' briefs, the respondents' briefs, and the opinions authored
by Chief Justice Roberts in his first Term. The following table
displays the degree to which the opinion citations corresponded with
the cases used in the parties' opening briefs. For each decision, I
show the number of common cases in the petitioner's and
respondent's opening brief, how many of those cases appeared in the
opinion drafted by Roberts, how many cases cited in the opinion were
unique to one party's brief, the number of cases introduced in the
opinion found in neither brief, and the prevailing party in the case.
Results are displayed in Table 3.
around a third of citations to over four-fifths of sources of authority and averaged around
sixty percent. Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SC.
1018, 1025 (1996). This suggests that the Supreme Court treats its prior decisions as a very
important, if not the primary, source of law to be applied in its opinions.
143. See tbl.3 infra.
144. HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 105, at 22.
145. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Table 3. Opinion Citations Compared with Briefs.
Common Common Unique to Unique to Unique Prevailing
Case Cases in Cases in Petitioner Respondent to
Briefs Opinion Brief Brief Opinion Party
Martin v. Franklin
Capital Corp.146  10 7 0 5 4 Respondent
Rumsfeld v. 22 13 5 6 7 Petitioner
FAIR
147
Jones v. Flowers148  3 3 10 0 24 Petitioner
DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno149  22 6 7 12 24 Petitioner
Sereboff v. Mid
Atlantic Medical 9 4 3 5 8 Respondent
Services, Inc. 
150
House v. Bell151  13 10 1 5 4 Petitioner
Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon1 52  52 21 9 15 35 Respondent
Gonzalez v.
UDV153  31 9 6 1 8 Respondent
Brigham City v.
Stuart 54  6 5 10 3 10 Petitioner
Initially, the results of the investigation of these Roberts opinions
and the parties' briefs suggest that precedent is not highly binding on
the Court but is a very discretionary choice. The opinions cited, on
average, less than half the cases found in both the petitioners' and
respondents' briefs. While both parties believed these cases to be
relevant, the opinion ignored them. Moreover, the opinion
introduced more cases, not found in either brief, than the number of
cited cases found in both briefs. Given the caliber of representation
at the Supreme Court level, this is surely surprising. It seems plain
that Justice Roberts exercised considerable discretion in choosing
which precedents to cite.
546 U.S. 132 (2005).
547 U.S. 47 (2006).
547 U.S. 220 (2006).
547 U.S. 332 (2006).
547 U.S. 356 (2006).
547 U.S. 518 (2006).
548 U.S. 331 (2006).
546 U.S. 418 (2006).
547 U.S. 398 (2006).
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Of the four cases "followed" in Brigham, as discussed above, one
was cited in both briefs, while three were found only in the
petitioner's brief.155  All four stood for roughly the same
proposition.'56 This appears to be a case where Chief Justice Roberts
cited more authority than the minimum the respondent thought
necessary. Perhaps this was to demonstrate the consistency of the
principle in the Court, though it may have reflected his desire to add
"vitality" to certain past opinions, as suggested by Hansford and
Spriggs." 7 This decision also "overruled in part" three opinions, one
from a circuit court and two from state courts. Of these, one was
common to both briefs and two were unique to the opinion. All three
stood for the proposition that the officer's subjective intent was a
relevant consideration. 5 8 Here, the opinion seemingly went out of its
way to undermine contrary authority. The significance of these
citations may not be great, though, as the effect of the opinion on
their continued vitality was clear and independent of the treatment.
For this case, the citation choices may only have reflected
thoroughness of research at the Court.
The decision in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academics and
Institutional Rights, Inc.'59 provides another interesting study of
choice of precedent. In this opinion, Chief Justice Roberts
distinguished ten prior Supreme Court opinions, which indicates a
distinct attempt to shape the law. 6' Of these ten, eight were found in
both parties' briefs, which suggest that he may have had little
discretion in dealing with them.' One was found in the losing party's
brief, but one case (Healy v. James162) was raised ab initio, implying
some affirmative intent to minimize its influence. The commonality
of most of the distinguished decisions, however, colors the Hansford
155. The cases cited in the Petitioner's brief were Whren, Scott, Bond, and Graham,
while, of the four, respondent only cited Whren.
156. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000) (excluding evidence of searched
bag based on objective expectations); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)
(holding that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops does not depend on officers'
motivations); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (applying the objective
reasonableness standard to Fourth Amendment investigatory stop); Scott v. United States,
436 U.S. 128 (1975) (holding that courts should provide objective assessment of officer
action under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act).
157. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
158. See United States v. Cervantes, 219 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2000); People v. Mitchell,
347 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1976); State v. Mountford, 769 A.2d 639 (Vt. 2000).
159. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
160. Tbl.3 supra.
161. Id.
162. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
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and Spriggs findings and suggests that the Justices' discretion in
applying negative treatment may be limited.
Another interesting evaluation involves the prior opinions
ignored by the Supreme Court's opinion. One might assume that
cases cited by the briefs of both parties, but ignored by the Court's
opinion, might imply some affirmative avoidance of the decision.
Examination of additional cases and contrast with dissenting or
concurring opinions might reveal more about the strategic discretion
that may be used in citation practices.
CONCLUSION
This study does not resolve the dispute over the Roberts Court
and precedent. Its results suggest that Chief Justice Roberts is quite
committed to precedent but not only as a restraint; he sometimes
alters the law by applying stare decisis in a variety of ways. He did
not ignore or overrule precedent, so much as he sought to shape its
directions. As a dismantler rather than a bomb-thrower,163 his
approach is more modest and subject to reversal. Nonetheless, it may
be equally powerful, or even more powerful in advancing a legal or
ideological agenda, because Chief Justice Roberts is building an
edifice of precedent that may someday be quite solid.1"
The tentative data suggest that Chief Justice Roberts puts great
importance on precedent, but not in the precise sense that was
commonly invoked. He appears to view stare decisis as an evolving
process, in which prior opinions are not straightjackets that dictate his
decisions but are instead boundaries that shape the nature of his
opinions. The Chief Justice also appears dedicated to creating a new
path of stare decisis that will direct the course of future rulings. This
is a more sophisticated understanding of the legal process, escaping
the binary "precedent governs/precedent doesn't matter" false
163. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
164. Dworkin suggested that the recent opinions of the Roberts Court were "part of a
strategy" to enable the eventual overruling of liberal precedents. Dworkin, supra note 36,
at 101. Perhaps, but the truth may be more complicated. In some ways, the strategy may
be more threatening to liberal opinions than one of overruling. Rather than overrule a
liberal precedent, the strategy may provide for the cooption of liberal precedents for
conservative ends (as in Roberts's reference to Brown on affirmative action). See Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. _, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2767-68
(2007). However, the strategy may be less threatening in the sense that the original
opinions remain valid and, if the ideological judicial winds change, they may still form the
basis of a future liberal jurisprudence. Thus, the approach is somewhat modest, like
planting a seed that may grow, but only if nurtured by future courts.
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dichotomy. Legal researchers need to develop a better understanding
of this process.
My empirical findings are very tentative and preliminary because
they involve only one Term of the Court. A rough comparison of
each Justice's citations for the immediately prior Term showed some
variance in citation rates by Justice.65 The sample is even smaller for
the closer analyses of treatment of precedents and comparison to the
briefs of the parties. Consequently, the results should be considered
as intriguing observations, rather than reliable bases for confident
conclusions.
These findings also suggest follow-up research to be done on the
seminal Hansford and Spriggs study. The significant differences
among Justices in their citation rates and their types of citations
suggest that their results could possibly be driven, or at least
influenced, by opinion authors. Some Justices may be more strategic
with their citations than others. Moreover, analysis of the parties'
briefs could provide a better control on citation choices. For
example, it would be interesting to find if the use of negative citations
was associated with unavoidable citations, or if the Justices
affirmatively chose cases unreferenced by the briefs to treat
negatively. The latter discovery would truly exemplify strategic
political citation practices.
My primary hope for this Article is to give ideas to future
researchers about new ways in which the legal model of judicial
decisionmaking might be analyzed. A Justice's use of a particular
precedent and treatment of that precedent apparently involves
considerable discretion. Identifying the extent of such discretion and
how it is used requires further research. I hope to highlight the tools
that might be used in such a study, and particularly the value of
examining the briefs of the parties as a cue for evaluating the Court's
citation practices. With more resources, a researcher might examine
not just the presence of citations in the briefs, but also the relative
weight the counsel for the litigants afforded them. Such an approach
165. In the final Term of the Rehnquist Court, Justice Stevens cited an average of
fourteen cases per opinion (versus seventeen in the first Term of the Roberts Court), and
Justice Kennedy cited an average of seventeen cases per opinion (versus twelve in the first
Term of the Roberts Court). While this intra-Justice variance is relatively small compared
to the inter-Justice variation in Table 1, supra, a broader sample is necessary to draw
confident conclusions. Chief Justice Rehnquist in this Term cited an average of nine cases
per opinion, a low figure that suggests that opinion assignment authority may not explain
higher citation rates by Chief Justices.
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could better identify the unavoidable citations and perhaps find
evidence of affirmative avoidance of precedent by the Justices.
